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The last two and a half years have witnessed a curious debate in virology characterized
by a remarkable lack of discussion. It goes by the misleading epithet “gain of function”
(GOF) influenza virus research, or simply GOF. As will be seen, there is nothing good to be
gained.The controversial experiments confer aerosol transmission on avian influenza virus
strains that can infect humans, but which are not naturally transmitted between humans.
Some of the newer strains are clearly highly pathogenic for man. It will be shown here
that the benefits of the work are erroneous and overstated while the risk of an accident
is finite, if small. The consequence of any accident would be anywhere from a handful of
infections to a catastrophic pandemic. There has been a single open international meeting
in this period, which is surprising given that openness and discussion are essential to good
science. Despite US and EU government funding, no risk–benefit analysis has been pub-
lished, which again is surprising. This research can be duplicated readily in many labs and
requires little high tech. It falls under the definition of DURC without the slightest shadow
of a doubt and constitutes the most important challenge facing contemporary biology.
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Science excels in making things that work: vaccines, smart phones,
and airplanes. This is the implicit promise made to society and
one underpinned by basic science. “If you invest in the biomed-
ical research enterprise, ultimately it will deliver products that
will impact global health and alleviate suffering.” Biomedicine has
delivered on this promise with spectacular success – average life
expectancy is now out to 80 years and beyond in some countries.
Making things that work relies on solid data that resist the
tests of time. With a background in HIV evolution and genetics, I
became drawn to the latest hot topic in virology, which is to pre-
dict the future of rapidly evolving viruses such as avian influenza
A H5N1 or H7N9 (1–4). I was bothered because the claims about
delivering vaccines and drugs based on lab experiments did not
square with my understanding of rapidly mutating viruses (5).
The issue is how these avian viruses will evolve and whether
we can anticipate their trajectories by performing accelerated or
forced evolution experiments in the lab. If yes, the reasoning goes
that we can make vaccines out of these strains, develop drugs, and
stockpile them, so heading off a future pandemic, assuming that
a similar, but this time naturally arising strain, emerged. The vac-
cine goal is the most touted of benefits, no doubt because of their
phenomenal cost–benefit ratio.
In the last 100 years, influenza pandemics occurred in 1918,
1957, 1968, 1977, and 2009, meaning that a pandemic can strike
every 10–40 years. Influenza A viruses are distinguished by one of
16 hemagglutinins (H) and one of 9 neuraminidase (N) proteins
on the surface of the virus, essentially marking them out anti-
genically. There are 110 strains of avian influenza viruses carrying
one of 16 hemagglutinins (H1–H16) and one of 9 neuraminidase
(N1–N9) proteins. The reservoir of influenza viruses in ducks,
shorebirds, birds, and chickens is by far the largest among animals,
although it is also found among pigs, dogs, and horses, to mention
a few species.
As viral crystal-ball-gazing is a new topic with a scant literature,
let us look at the track record for predicting influenza pandemics.
Pandemic viruses in man are referred to as H1N1 (1918, 1977,
and 2009), H2N2 (1957), and H3N2 (1968). For the Spanish flu
virus (H1N1 1918), all eight segments of the genome came from
bird strains. The 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 viruses represented
mixes of more avian viruses along with parts of the 1918 virus.
1977 H1N1 represented an accidental reintroduction of an old
vaccine strain pre-1957, probably from a Russian research lab (6).
Only by the twenty-first century did we have the wherewithal
in evolutionary and genetic terms to have even the slightest chance
of predicting a pandemic. All bets were on an avian virus spilling
over in SE Asia. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic was a surprise on at
least three counts: (1) it emerged from swine, (2) it was in NW
Mexico, and (3) it represented the first time that a pandemic was
initiated by a strain belonging to a virus that was already circu-
lating – descendants of 1977 H1N1 were around in 2009 (7). In
short, flu virologists were far from the mark (8–10).
Other avian influenza viruses cross over to humans causing
mild to severe disease with case fatality rates that can sometimes
approach 60%. Despite this, these viruses are hardly ever trans-
mitted between humans because they lack the mutations enabling
them to grow well in the upper respiratory tract. As such, they
represent dead-end infections. In the last 17 years, the number of
unequivocally documented H5N1 cases in humans is of the order
of 650 or so. For H7N9 human infections, the number is 448 and
rising. For both examples, the viruses spilled over directly from
mixtures of duck, chicken, and bird strains. H7N9 was totally off
the radar when it first struck in China in 2013 (11). Indeed, there
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had not been a single prior report of H7N9 in humans, which
was very worrying and again illustrates how little we still know
about flu viruses. However, when turning to serological surveys,
which are woefully few, one finds that viruses from at least 11
hemagglutinin groups can be detected in farm workers in China
(12). Presumably, these represent mild to asymptomatic infections
that essentially go unrecorded. It shows that very probably large
numbers of avian influenza viruses silently spill over to humans
without any fuss.
In an attempt to recapitulate the evolutionary process and
to anticipate the future, two groups performed forced evolution
experiments on avian H5N1 influenza strains from 2004 and
2005. They used a ferret transmission model. The ferret is the
animal of choice in influenza research for a number of reasons,
one of which is that the animal sneezes, much as humans do.
When housed in adjacent cages with an airflow carrying aerosols
from the infected animal across to the receiver ferret, it is pos-
sible to ascertain whether a virus is capable of efficient airborne
transmission. By repeating the process four to five times, they
rapidly selected for such viruses (1, 2). Actually, the number of
ferrets in each experiment was so small as to invite criticism
on statistical grounds alone (13). While the ferret model has its
limits, as pandemic human viruses are transmissible between fer-
rets by the airborne route, it could be assumed that these viruses
will be so.
A more recent study on an H7N1 strain started with a virus
that was lethal in ferrets with neurological complications (4).
With minimal effort, a strain transmitted by the airborne route
was obtained without loss of pathogenicity. In the earlier studies
on H5N1 avian influenza, few ferrets showed respiratory distress.
Now we are dealing with strains capable of a lethal respiratory-
acquired infection. Obviously the“proof”experiment, inoculation
of human volunteers with one of these lab-generated viruses, can-
not be ethically performed. Yet, this creates a very unsatisfactory
situation because science is about resolving conjecture, not mak-
ing it. Assessing the risk to humans is equally stymied by these
unfalsifiable findings, to use a Popperian term. Needless to say,
precautionary logic and a savant interpretation of Murphy’s Law
suggests that these viruses should be considered as highly dan-
gerous for man. In short, the risk level has been enhanced by
this work.
At a 2014 meeting on infectious diseases, Dr. Kawaoka reported
experiments whereby he forced the evolution of the pandemic
H1N1 2009 virus so that it could escape from natural human anti-
body responses. The experiment was not complicated: it involved
simply mixing virus with sera from individuals who had been
naturally infected and selecting out the virus that was not neu-
tralized. A total of 15 sites on the virus hemagglutinin protein
were identified. Concentrating on five of these sites, he was able
to produce strains that completely escaped human antibodies and
extant vaccine coverage. This experiment is different from prior
avian influenza virus gain of function (GOF) experiments in that
we know the virus is readily transmissible among humans – after
all these lab-made strains are derived from the pandemic H1N1
2009 virus! As the strains escape vaccine control, they constitute,
unambiguously, a HUGE risk to man.
Increased risk per se should not be frowned on if there are sub-
stantial benefits to be had. So what are the purported benefits of
influenza A GOF research?
As the proponents talk about stockpiling preventive vaccines
(4), we will examine this hypothesis. Given the annual change in
the antigenic composition of a virus, the tried and tested working
rule toward making a vaccine is to select from circulating strains
those that are most likely to cover the world’s population in the
next few months. The CDC has just reiterated this logic by their
choice of viruses for the season 2014–15 (14). A single antigenic
mismatch can substantially reduce vaccine efficiency. As men-
tioned above, there are 110 genetically confirmed combinations
of avian hemagglutinin and neuraminidases presently circulating
in ducks, shorebirds, and birds.
Perhaps a subset of these 110 avian viruses might pose a threat
to man, yet we simply do not know this. The recent isolation of
H10N8 from two patients, one of who had underlying immuno-
suppression and subsequently died (15), sparked three commen-
taries from influenza virologists along the lines of “H10N8, the
next pandemic?” (16–18). Such dramatic extrapolation from two
case reports does not help for sound science. But if we take them
at face value, then we need a vaccine to this strain.
For complete coverage in the US, the cost of 314 million doses
of a commercially available influenza vaccine to the public sector
is presently between $6 and 15 per dose1, or between $1.9 and 4.7
billion. To be fully prepared for a pandemic would require preven-
tive and stockpiled vaccines for all 110 strains. This ramps up the
cost to something of the order of $209–517 billion. As the shelf life
of an inactivated vaccine is ~12 months at 2–8°C, these would be
annual costs2. Even if the number of vaccines were reduced to one
per hemagglutinin (there are more distinct H than N proteins),
a minimum number would be 16 stockpiled vaccines, or $30–75
billion annual costs.
These back-of-an-envelope calculations show that stockpiling
vaccines is effectively science fiction, even if, with economies of
scale, costs could be slashed by a factor of 10. Of course, these
numbers ignore investments in staff and production facilities, to
mention just a couple of issues. By comparison, radical investment
in developing a near-universal flu vaccine, or vaccines that induced
broad immune responses might be much cheaper.
Regarding the development of anti-viral drugs, the response is
binary. If the virus is sensitive, society will go with what already
exists. If not, the development of novel drugs normally involves
a >10-year-cycle to get to market with a winnowing down of a
large number of candidate molecules down to a very small num-
ber. Again the costs are huge and without a clear virus strain in the
crosshairs, backed up by a scientific consensus, industry will not
rise to the challenge.
What is the chance of experimentally settling on a combination
of mutations that allows, say, avian H12N5 to become transmis-
sible between ferrets that could also be thrown up by nature?
1http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/awardees/vaccine-management/
price-list/#adflu
2http://www.who.int/immunization_standards/vaccine_quality/pq_239_
influenza_seasonal_10dose_sanofi_pasteur/en/
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I, for one, have not the slightest idea. You could perhaps doc-
ument a restricted number of mutations but these would still
be a reasonably large number allowing numerous permutations.
The notion of hitting on a single solution is highly erroneous
and constitutes a flawed appreciation of evolution. For exam-
ple, over the course of evolution, the eye evolved independently
something like 40 times. Taking an example from my world of
retroviruses, there are at least six different ways to express the
reverse transcriptase gene.
And so it goes with influenza. While the initial papers on
H5N1 showed that the hemagglutinin gene had acquired impor-
tant mutations to allow it to bind to human receptor molecules
in the upper respiratory tract, a subsequent paper showed that
the same mutations did not confer the same phenotype on other
H5N1 viruses currently circulating (19). This is not surprising to
virologists, or scientists with knowledge of protein structure. The
overriding question is how many solutions are out there? It may
not be possible to answer this accurately, although with techniques
such as saturation mutagenesis, it may be possible to asymptote
toward defining a fraction for an individual flu protein. With reg-
ular exchange of avian influenza genes, it will be an extraordinarily
difficult challenge.
To resume, virological crystal-ball-gazing is even harder than
the real thing. Virology can only deliver a limited number of
answers in this area, very few of which may be useful for the
development of effective pandemic vaccines, anti-viral drugs, or
enhanced pandemic preparedness. By contrast, rapid surveillance
and communication of findings seems to be de rigueur and have
been shown to work in the real world. Existing networks are pick-
ing up isolated cases of H6N1 and H10N8 avian influenza meaning
that they are doing a very good job (15, 20). In all likelihood, these
will be dead-end infections that will not set off a pandemic, which
are rare events given past information.
These forced evolution influenza virus experiments are most
unlikely to deliver much practical information, nothing that a
Health Minister could mobilize around. Meanwhile the risks are
finite and small, but of catastrophic proportions if ever there was
a breakdown of biosafety or biosecurity.
Advocates of this GOF research are off the mark for three other
reasons. First, scientists are notoriously optimistic about their
work and systematically underestimate risk (21). When pushed,
they can hardly find a web page or reference citing the data about
lab accidents. Second, they feel that once funded they should be
free to publish – it has become a struggle for many in what is
a crazily competitive race where publishing in big journals is a
question of survival. “A paper in Nature is worth every risk” is
how a colleague who fled Budapest in 1956 summed it up. Cer-
tainly, scientists should be as unfettered as possible, but enhancing
the danger level of a virus impacts public safety and society as a
whole. Society is the ultimate arbiter, a fact revealed by the sci-
entists themselves in their grant proposals and papers where they
explain how dangerous their virus is. They never miss an occasion
that includes mortality statistics in a basic science manuscript, or
to point out that a vaccine and drugs to their virus are lacking. So
why is it they are so refractory to discussion and openness? Where are
the three or four flu congresses where this topic has been openly
debated?
This inability to discuss goes further. Surprisingly, no gov-
ernment agency, learned body, or independent organization has
commissioned a comprehensive risk–benefit analysis on GOF
influenza research, despite more than 2 years of controversy.
Almost none of my colleagues are aware of the 2007 InterAcad-
emy Panel (IAP) statement that“Scientists [too] have an obligation
to do no harm.”3. Indeed, let us discuss what is and what is not
DURC, but let us not hide or forget the IAP statement.
The third point concerns dissemination of information. These
flu virologists are not trying to hurt their fellow beings, nor delib-
erately trying to set off an influenza pandemic. Yet, they are part
of the paper race to publish. Once published, these studies can
be reproduced at far less cost. Knowledge that it can be done
is enough. And if reproduced in other labs with lower contain-
ment facilities or scrutiny, these strains could well proliferate, the
corollary being an increased risk of an accidental release. Most
scientists would see this as not part of their brief; “I did my bit,
I’m not responsible for others.” In short, the larger picture, that
of DURC, is simply not on their radar, the terms not part of their
vocabulary. This absence of reflection was apparent in the debate
about redacting parts of the original manuscripts on H5N1 GOF
research. The papers were uploaded via the Internet, which means
that they were on the cloud. Any computer security jock could find
the data. Correct? I asked a colleague to track down a manuscript
from my lab that had uploaded to a major journal. He had only
the title page and agreed not to hack the Institut Pasteur server,
which would have been too easy. He retrieved a complete pdf of
the manuscript compiled by the journal web site in <2 min! This
shows just how computer naïve the original discussion was.
The DURC issue, particularly in our Internet age, needs far
more debate. Even though the risk of an error or a lab accident
may be small, the consequences could be catastrophic. For this
work to proceed, there needs to be a clear consensus based on an
open discussion that the benefits outweigh the risks. Judging by
the controversy, a consensus is clearly lacking (22, 23).
By resorting to semantics, or hiding behind the cloak of free-
dom to investigate, or whipping up fears about increased regu-
lation, yet continuing GOF work, these researchers are showing
themselves to be remarkably cavalier, disdainful of public opinion,
and totally averse to discussion, which is a contradiction in terms
for scientists. Their imperviousness will ultimately boomerang on
the flu community that has shown an esprit de corps typical of
a medieval guild. Ultimately, society will have the last word. My
fear is that before the issue is settled there will be an accident
or an incident resulting in a terrible backlash on biomedicine.
Thereafter, the new dynamics will harsher. I do not even want to
contemplate the nightmare of a man-made pandemic.
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